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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW GREEK
CONSTITUTION
A. A. Fatouros *
The new Greek Constitution which entered into force on June 11, 1975,1
offers to international lawyers an illustration of the increasing importance
given to international legal issues by politicians and constitutional experts
as they attempt to fashion constitutional structures more in keeping with
contemporary international realities. The provisions of the new Constitu-
tion concerning international law and relations which are discussed here
are largely consistent with current constitutional trends in Western Europe.
They, and the debate around them, may also yield useful insights into the
role and importance of the international legal context for a small country
actively involved in and influenced by world affairs. They are thus of in-
terest not only to those who follow political events in Greece but to a
wider public concerned with democracy and internationalism.
The parliamentary process that led to the .adoption of the 1975 Con-
stitution was peculiar, reflecting the formal and substantive difficulties of
the country's passage, in the latter half of 1974, from a brutal and dis-
astrous dictatorship to democratic government. The interim government
that came to power after the fall of the dictatorship issued a "Constitutional
Act" (i.e., a law with enhanced formal validity) which provided for a
referendum to determine whether the country would be beaded by a
hereditary king or an elected president and for a constitution-making pro-
cedure in Parliament, to be completed in three months.2 The Parliament
elected on November 17, 1974 was thus charged with revision of the entire
Constitution, subject only to the outcome of the referendum; the latter was
held on December 8, 1974, and gave overwhelming approval to an "un-
crowned republic." The government formed after the elections proceeded
speedily to prepare a draft for the new Constitution." Counterproposals,
* Indiana University School of Law. The author wishes to express his thanks to
Mr. George Mavrogordatos for his advice and his expert assistance in locating docu-
mentation.
3 Greek Government Gazette, Fase. A, No. 111, June 9, 1975. An "official transla-
tion" was printed in 1 NEw GRE CE No. 7 (July 1975) 18-26, and No. 8 (Aug.-Sept.
1975) 18-29. The translation used here is based on it, but with extensive modifica-
tions. Citation of parliamentary debates and documents has been kept to a minimum,
in part because only provisional texts were available at the time of writing.
2Constitutional Act of October 3/4, 1974, text (in Greek) in 1 To SYNTAGMA 86
(1975). While the time limits were later extended, the entire constitution-making
process, from submission of the government draft to entry in force of the Constitution,
lasted less than six months. As a result, a certain lack of deliberate study and detailed
preparation is reflected in both the debates surrounding the Constitution and the
final text. See, e.g., infra note 21.
S The draft was first published on December 21, 1974; it was formally submitted to
Parliament, after slight modification, on January 7, 1975.
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in the form of draft amendments, were eventually submitted by the opposi-
tion parties. Among numerous unofficial discussions and proposals, a set
of proposed amendments prepared by a small group of "constitutional ex-
perts" was particularly influential.'
In Parliament, a Committee on the Constitution was formed and divided
into two subcommittees. Debate on the Constitution was thus conducted
in three phases-in subcommittee, in full committee, and in regular meet-
ings of the entire Parliament. Toward the end of the last phase of the
debate, the opposition parties decided to abstain from the remaining
constitution-making sessions, in order to express their radical rejection of
certain provisions concerning presidential powers and to protest the domi-
nation of the entire proceedings by the ruling party, which has an over-
whelming majority in parliamentary seats. The last debate on several of
the Constitution's provisions (including Article 36 concerning treaty-
making) and the final vote on the entire text were thus held in the absence
of opposition members of Parliament.
The provisions of the new Constitution that pertain to international law
deal with four main topics: treaty-making, participation in international
organizations, protection of national independence, and relations between
international and municipal law.5 They are contained in little more than
three articles. Of these, two (Articles 27 and 36) repeat, with modifica-
tions, provisions already present in earlier Greek Constitutions. The others
(Articles 2(2) and 28) are new. The text of the relevant articles follows:
Article 2
2. Greece, adhering to the generally recognized rules of international
law, seeks the strengthening of peace and justice, and the develop-
ment of friendly relations among peoples and States.
' The proposals were published in the Greek press. See, e.g., To VnmA, Jan. 19, 21,
22, and 23, 1975. Proposed amendments based on several of these were later intro-
duced in Parliament. The experts' group consisted of half a dozen legal scholars, well-
known for their resistance against the dictatorship and located, politically, at various
points within the opposition. The same group had prepared earlier a booklet, with
more general PaOOSxS FOR A DE~mocRAc CoNsrruTnoN (Athens, 1975, in Greek).
The author should here disclose personal bias in that he briefly collaborated with the
group in the drafting of proposals for the international law clauses of the Constitution.
5 The new Constitution touches on international affairs in certain other provisions,
as well. Article 4, paragraph 3, allows deprivation of Greek nationality only in the
cases of voluntary acquisition of another nationality and of service "contrary to the
national interests" in a foreign country. Article 5, paragraph 2, provides:
All persons living in the Greek territory shall enjoy full protection of their life,
honor and freedom, regardless of nationality, race or language and of religious or
political beliefs. Exceptions are permitted only in the cases provided for by
international law.
The extradition of aliens prosecuted for their activities in defense of freedom
is prohibited.
Article 107 continues the practice initiated under the 1952 Constitution of offering
foreign investors special protection under a statute of enhanced formal validity. See
also Article 100(1)(vi), infra note 41.
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Article 27
1. No change in the boundaries of the State can be made without a
law passed by the absolute majority of the total number of members
of Parliament.
2. Foreign military forces shall not be accepted in the Greek State,
and may not remain in it or pass through it, without a law voted by
the absolute majority of the total number of members of Parliament.
Article 28
1. The generally accepted rules of international law, as well as
international conventions from the time they are sanctioned a by law
and enter into force according to each one's own terms, shall be an
integral part of internal Greek law, and they shall prevail over any
contrary provision of law. The application of the rules of international
law and of international conventions to aliens is always subject to the
condition of reciprocity.
2. To serve an important national interest and to promote coopera-
tion with other States, competences under the Constitution may be
granted by treaty or agreement to organs of international organiza-
tions. A majority of three-fifths of the total number of members of
Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law sanctioning the treaty or
agreement.
3. Greece may freely proceed, by law voted by the absolute majority
of the total number of members of Parliament, to limit the exercise
of national sovereignty, if this is dictated by an important national
interest, does not infringe upon human rights and the foundations of
democratic government and is effected on the basis of the principles
of equality and under the condition of reciprocity.
Article 36
1. The President of the Republic, complying in any case with the
provisions of article 35 paragraph 1,7 shall represent the State inter-
nationally, declare war, conclude treaties of peace, alliance, economic
cooperation and participation in international organizations or unions,
and announce them to Parliament with the necessary clarifications
when the interest and the security of the State permit it.
2. Treaties on commerce, as well as those on taxation, economic
cooperation, and participation in international organizations or unions,
and any others that contain concessions as to which under other pro-
visions of the Constitution no provision can be made without a law,
or that impose a burden upon the Greeks individually, shall have no
force without sanctioning by a law voted by Parliament.
3. Secret articles of a treaty may never reverse the public ones.
4. The sanctioning of international treaties may not be the object
of legislative delegation as provided by article 43, paragraphs 2 and 4.8
6 On the precise meaning of that term, see infra, note 22, and accompanying text.
7 Article 35(1) requires that all acts of the President must be cosigned by the com-
petent Minister, subject to certain exceptions listed in* the second paragraph of the
article.
8Article 43(2) and (4) provide for possible delegation of legislative powers to the
President in certain cases, by means of an Act of Parliament.
(Vol. 70
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TREATY- NUUG
The initial draft submitted by the government repeated, with slight
modification, the relevant article of the 1952 Constitution.9 Originally
taken from the Belgian Constitution of 1831 10 and inserted in the first
Greek Constitution of 1844, this provision found its way into all later Greek
Constitutions. Objections to the draft's limited conception of the role of
Parliament were expressed in newspaper articles "1 and in the constitutional
experts' proposed amendments.' 2 The latter's proposals on this point were
substantially adopted and submitted to Parliament by the opposition
parties.
These counterproposals sought to enhance the role of Parliament in the
treaty-making process and in international affairs in general.' 3 Permission
by Parlianent (or a parliamentary committee) was to be required for a
declaration of war.'4  Parliamentary approval was to be required for all
international agreements, expressly in the case of specified categories
(treaties of peace, alliance, establishment, taxation, participation in inter-
national organizations, etc.) and tacitly (i.e., through one month's inaction
by Parliament after notice by the government) in the case of all others.' 5
0 Article 32.
The King shall be the supreme Head of State; he shall command the armed forces,
declare war, conclude treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, and announce them
to Parliament with the necessary clarifications when the interest and the security
of the State permit it. However, treaties of commerce, as well as any others that
contain concessions as to which under other provisions of the present Constitution
no provision can be made without a law, or that impose a burden upon the Greeks
individually, shall have no force without the consent of Parliament.
Translation (with modifications) from 3 A. PEASLEE, CoNsTuIT oNs OF NAnoNs 403,
409 (3d ed. by D. Peaslee Xydis, 1968).
The main changes proposed in the government draft were the substitution of the
President for the King, the removal to other articles of the first two clauses, and the
requirement that parliamentary consent be given by act of Parliament.
10 Article 68, 3 PE sLEE supra note 9, at 77, 84.
11 See A. A. Fatouros, International Relations and the Constitution, To VniA, Jan. 3,
1975; G. Tenekides, Our External Orientations and the Constitution-I, id. Jan. 14,
1975; S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, International Rules and the New Constitution, id.
March 13, 1975 (all articles in Greek).
12 See, in particular, To VniA, Jan. 19, 1975.
13 It is interesting to note that one of the earliest Greek Constitutions, promulgated
in 1827, before the end of the War of Independence and the definite formation of the
Greek State, also insisted on a significant role of Parliament in treaty-making. It pro-
vided (see. 95):
The Government cannot, without the Parliament's consent, declare war or con-
clude treaties of peace, alliance, friendship, commerce, and neutrality. Armistice
agreements of a few days' duration are excepted, but even then the Government
must notify Parliament immediately.
14 A provision to similar effect had been included in the only other republican Greek
Constitution (of 1927) in its Article 83.
"5 Compare on this point the Constitution of The Netherlands, as amended in 1953,
Articles 58-67. See H. F. van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and International
Law, 47 AJIL 537 (1953); van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and Inter-
national Law: A Decade of Experience, 58 id. 88 (1964). For further historical dis-
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It was further provided that all governmental actions which bind the
nation toward foreign states and individuals or toward international or-
ganizations should be communicated to Parliament, confidentially if neces-
sary. This provision was intended to cover commitments made unilaterally
or by formal or informal agreement, especially concerning economic and
financial matters (e.g., loan guarantees, "letters of intent" addressed to
the International Monetary Fund, etc). The opposition proposals also re-
jected the possibility of secret agreements or provisions and suggested
deletion of the relevant paragraph.16
These positions appear to have had some slight impact on the final text
(e.g., inclusion of additional treaty categories requiring parliamentary ap-
proval, the explicit exclusion of approval through legislative delegation,
etc.). In their basic thrust, however, they were rejected by the govern-
ment majority, on the ground that parliamentary participation in foreign
affairs decision-making would involve delays and difficulties and would
excessively limit the government's freedom of action.17 The final text re-
mains very close to earlier versions. Executive primacy in international
affairs is clearly recognized. The President may freely conclude treaties
on many subjects without informing Parliament, before or even after their
conclusion. Secret treaties and secret clauses in treaties are allowed. The
Parliament's cooperation is necessary only for limited (although admittedly
significant) categories of treaties, primarily those involving matters of
exceptional importance' 8 or concerning economic matters. Rejection of
opposition proposals for the creation of a permanent parliamentary com-
mittee on external affairs further confirms the Executive's predominance.1 0
The language of earlier versions, not noted for clarity, has been retained.
The reference to treaties which "impose a burden upon the Greeks in-
dividually" has by now acquired a fairly definite meaning (covering es-
sentially treaties requiring appropriations of public funds, thus "burdening"
taxpayers) by virtue of long practice and application. Yet, a clearer for-
mulation could easily have been found. More important, the negative
cussion and analysis (bringing out, among other things, that earlier Netherlands
Constitutions had provisions on treaty-making which closely resembled the Belgian
and Creek versions referred to earlier), see L. ERADEs and W. L. GouLD, Tur TrEA-
TONS BmEw= L.E n IERNATIoNAL w AND Mumcn'AL LAw 3w =r NErHELANDS AND
ix TH UNITED STATEs, esp. at 178-206 (1961). For some recent efforts in a similar
direction in the United States, see, C. Olly, Advice and Consent: International Execu-
tive Claims Settlement Agreements, 5 CALIoRN WESTERN INR=NATiONAL L. Rnv.
271 (1975); and of. 69 AJIL 864-71 (1975).
x6Present Article 36(3). Its language (again taken from the Belgian Constitution
of 1831) is found in all earlier Greek Constitutions.
17 See, in particular, the debate on declaration of war in the March 18, 1975 meeting
of the full Constitutional Committee of Parliament.
1sSee the discussion of Articles 27, 28(2) and (3), infra.
19 The initial governmental draft included an express prohibition on the creation of
parliamentary commissions of inquiry concerning foreign affairs (and national defense).
This provision was eventually replaced by that of the present Article 68(2) (b) which
requires a special majority for the creation of parliamentary commissions of inquiry
in these two areas.
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formulation of the need for legislative action (treaties "have no force"
unless sanctioned by law) gives no clear indication of the kind of invalidity
aimed at, that is to say, whether in international law or only internally.
The matter was long in dispute both in Belgium, whose Constitution first
used the formula, and in Greece; the prevailing view in both countries
has limited invalidity to internal law only.20 It is highly likely that the
revised language of Article 36(2) of the new Greek Constitution will be
construed in the same manner.21
Earlier practice and case-law, although by no means fully consistent,
permit certain clarifications concerning the role of the sanctioning act.
Greek constitutional law and doctrine distinguish between "sanctioning" 22
(kyrosis) and "ratification" (epikyrosis), the former term referring to the
domestic legal measure putting the treaty into effect in domestic law and
the latter corresponding to the international law meaning of that term. 28
According to recent practice, a treaty could be sanctioned not only by act
of Parliament 2- but also by executive (royal, presidential) decree, despite
the patent absence of any constitutional authorization for the latter
method.2r Whatever margin of discretion might have been found in the
language of earlier constitutions to justify this practice, it seems clearly
excluded by the 1975 Constitution. The newly added paragraph 4 of
Article 36, which forbids legislative delegation as to sanctioning, must
2 0 See, as to Belgium, P.-F. SmxTs, L'Ass= iENT DES CHA.NmRs LE ISLATWS Aux
ThArrs INTEATioNAux 62-69 (1964). And ef. more generally, H. Burx, TREATY-
MAXnOa PowEm 237-238 (1960) and passim; R. D. Kearney, Internal Limitations on
External Commitments-Article 46 of the Treaties Convention, 4 LvnNATIONAL
LAwym 1 (1969); P. REuTE, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT DES TRAMnS 28-30, 56 (1972).21 The language of the Constitution unfortunately reflects the haste in drafting. In
the provisions here considered, for example, three words (here translated as "treaty,"
"convention," and "agreement") are used to refer to international agreements, with
no indication of what difference, if any, is intended in their meaning. There is no
indication of a difference in meaning, either, between the "generally recognized" rules
of international law of Article 2(2) and the "generally accepted" rules of Article 28(1).22WEnsi's DicnIoNARY (3d ed.) gives as the first meaning of the verb "to sanc-
tion," "to make valid or binding: ratify, confirm or put into effect typically by decree,
flat or other formal procedure." Despite semantic accuracy, use of this term does not
make for elegance of style in English. It is however important to retain the distinction.
Greek usage, as well, even in formal legal language, is by no means free of confusion
between the two terms.
23 For a clear exposition of the distinction between the "international" and the "con-
stitutional sense" of "ratification," see, G. G. Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratifuwa-
tion? 15 Bmr. YEAmooi oF IN.ERNATIONAL LAw 113, at 113-116 (1934). And cf.
Paul Reuter's wise comments on "problems of vocabulary and problems of substance"
in the relationship between international and internal law, supra note 20, at 68-70.
24 There is further linguistic confusion here, since it would seem that, strictly speak-
ing, it is the head of state (now the President) who "sanctions" the treaty in all cases,
after Parliament has approved the related bill (as he does for all laws). Cf. Article
42(l) of the 1975 Constitution: "The President of the Republic sanctions, promulgates
and publishes the laws voted by Parliament within one month of the vote."2 5 See the succinct but valuable discussion in, D. J. Evrigenis, Les conflits de la loi
nationale avee les traitds internationaux en droit hell6nique, 18 REv. HELijNIQUE DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 353, 354, note 2 (1965).
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be understood to preclude a fortiori sanctioning by decree (except perhaps
where this is done in compliance with an existing, already sanctioned,
treaty, for instance, in the case of some decisions of international organiza-
tions or summary amendments to some multilateral constitutive conven-
tions). The constitutional language, in Article 28(1) as well as Article 36,
can be read most consistently to mean that there is only one way in which
a treaty becomes part of municipal law, namely, by act of Parliament sanc-
tioning it.
Such an act of Parliament has two functions (which, in other legal sys-
tems, are carried out by separate legal measures): on the one hand, it
authorizes (without obliging) the President to proceed to ratify the treaty,
and on the other, it "transforms" the treaty into internal law.20  There is
thus a possibility that a treaty may enter into effect internally in Greece
before it comes into effect internationally, or, indeed, it may never come
into force internationally, for whatever reason, while still being in force in
Greek domestic law.27 The new Constitution does not depart in this
respect from earlier law.
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSTrTUTIONS
Active involvement in international affairs in today's world may lead
to commitments which go beyond traditional reciprocal treaty undertakings.
Following the lead of several postwar Western European Constitutions,
the new Greek Constitution deals expressly with the possibility of such
extraordinary commitments. The relevant provisions allow such under-
takings, require parliamentary approval, impose special majority require-
ments for the related votes, and establish certain substantive conditions.
A first class of special undertakings consists of those which impose limita-
tions on the exercise of national sovereignty (Article 28(3)). A related
proposal was included in the government's original draft and may indeed
be found in certain earlier proposals submitted by the current Premier,
Constantine Karamanlis, in 1963 (as well as in the two pseudo-constitutions
prepared by the military junta in 1968 and 1973). The final formulation,
after extensive debate, much improved the original proposal by eliminat-
ing some broad declaratory language (which eventually became the short
statement in Article 2(2)) and by specifying certain restrictive conditions.
Such, undertakings must serve an "important national interest"; this re-
quirement cannot presumably be satisfied by mere invocation of the
country's "national interests" and imposes a burden of further specification
and detail. Two negative conditions (no infringement of human rights and
of democratic principles) serve to safeguard the domestic constitutional
2 On this point, see the perceptive detailed study by N. Valticos, Monlsme ou
dualisme? Les rapports des traitds et de la loi en Grace (sp6cfalement a propos des
conventions internationales du travail), 11 BEv. hLubaQuE DE: Dnorr INTEriNAToNAL
203, 208 ft. (1958).
27 The sanctioning act may, of course, provide that the date of the treaty's internal
entry into force depends on that of its international force. See, Valticos, supra note 26,
at 221.
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order, while two affirmative ones (equality and reciprocity) attempt to
exclude unilateral or unequal commitments toward foreign powers. Such
"requirements" sound rather vague; in any concrete instance, their applica-
tion is likely to give rise to differences in interpretation. But it is an
error to judge them as if their function were to serve as rigid constraints
or as specific directives for action. It is rather to provide the terms of
reference for future debate, to structure and channel argument, and organ-
ize around them future discussions, in Parliament or elsewhere, concerning
undertakings of the type considered. The strictest actual constraint is no
doubt the procedural requirement, the need for an absolute majority of
the total number of members of Parliament.
It is not quite clear to what sort of commitments this clause is addressed.
During the debate in Parliament, the distinction was made between "re-
strictions on the exercise of sovereign rights" and such restrictions coupled
with the "granting of sovereign competence" to international institutions.
The former issue is now covered in Article 28(3), the latter in Article
28(2). Obviously the two are closely related; the main reason for dealing
with them in separate paragraphs is that it was eventually decided to re-
quire different special majorities in each case.
Restrictions on sovereignty not involving concessions of competence
(i.e., those under Article 28(3) ) appear to cover such cases as the adoption
of human rights conventions or the establishment by treaty of free port
zones. The paragraph is couched in language broad enough to cover
restrictions undertaken not only by treaty but also by unilateral state act
(presumably in response to or in contemplation of parallel unilateral acts
by other states). One wonders how far the meaning of Article 28(3) can be
extended. All treaties may be understood (and have on occasion been
described) as imposing limitations on the unhampered exercise of national
sovereignty. If such a conception is seen as underlying Article 28(3),
many if not all international agreements, as well as all other state com-
mitments toward foreign states, even if not by treaty, would require the
special majority imposed by Article 28(3). Article 36 would then be
deprived of most of its effectiveness. Even if such a broad extension of
the scope of Article 28(3) were to be rejected, serious difficulties remain
in determining the exact limits of its application.2 1
The second category of extraordinary international commitments con-
sists of those which involve the grant by treaty of (supranational) au-
thority to international organs (Article 28(2)). This provision was pro-
posed and adopted mainly with Greece's full entry into the European
Economic Community in mind; it corresponds in this respect to recent
provisions in other European Constitutions. 9 Concern with the farreach-
28 Some guidance may be found in the study of similar provisions of two other
Western European Constitutions. See Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Law,
Article 23(2) and (3), 3 PEASLEE supra note 9, at 361, 366; Italy, Constitution (1947),
Article 11, id. 500, 501.
29 Cf., e.g., Federal Republic of Germany, Basic Law, Article 24(l). 3 NAsux
supra note 9, at 361, 366; The Netherlands, Constitution, Article 67, id., 652, 660-61.
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ing effects of such action in terms of effective restriction of national sov-
ereignty led to the imposition of a high special majority requirement. Two
affirmative requirements are also imposed: "important national interest"
and cooperation with other states. Some opposition proposals insisted on
the need to exclude expressly the application of this provision to "military
agreements" (i.e., NATO), on the ground that the provision as it stands
is far too broad. No such amendments passed.
It is curious that no other substantive restrictions are mentioned in this
paragraph. In particular, there is no express reference to the other affirma-
tive and negative conditions found in the companion provision of Article
28(3). It seems appropriate, however, to read those conditions into para-
graph (2), as well. As already noted, the tvo provisions largely overlap
in their subject matter, with paragraph (3) being more inclusive. It is
indeed impossible to imagine a concrete situation which would involve a
grant of sovereign competence to international institutions (per paragraph
(2)) and would not at the same time constitute a restriction on sovereignty
(per paragraph (3)). If there is need to safeguard human rights and
democratic principles and to insist on international equality and reciprocity
in the ease of commitments which do not include a grant of sovereign
competence, there is a fortiori need for the same conditions for more far-
reaching commitments, which include such a grant. The rather confused
legislative history of these two provisions appears to support such an
interpretation. 80
The net effect of paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 28 is to give Parlia-
ment, with respect to the specified categories of international commitments,
a significant role, going considerably beyond that provided for by Article
36(2). It is certainly arguable that in Article 28(2) and (3) (as well as
in Article 27), the new Greek Constitution makes parliamentary action in
the manner specified a condition for the international validity of any re-
lated international agreements and not only for their internal legal effect.
The manifest importance attached to the subject matter and the imposition
of numerous substantive conditions indicate that such agreements concern
Greek internal law rules "of fundamental importance," while the prom-
inence given in the Constitution to the special majorities required makes
any violation of these provisions "objectively evident to any state con-
ducting itself... in accordance with normal practice and good faith."
PROTECrION OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENcE
Both paragraphs of Article 27 repeat provisions found in the 1952 Con-
stitution (indeed, Article 27(1) is found in essentially similar form in all
sOlt may further be noted that reciprocity is also emphasized in paragraph (1) of
Article 28. It was indeed forcefully defended by the government spokesman in the re-
lated debate. In this respect too an a fortiori argument seems appropriate.
M. The quoted language is taken from Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which may be taken to express on this point a fairly general con-
sensus. For relevant comments, see the authors cited supra note 20 (in particular
Professor Reuter's remarks).
[Vol. 70
1976] nmENATONAL LAW 3N THE NEW GB _E CONSTrrUoN 501
Greek Constitutions since 1844). The single important change in 1975
was the addition of the requirement of a special majority. These provisions,
too, may be understood, on grounds similar to those advanced in the pre-
ceding paragraph, as making parliamentary action an express condition of
international, rather than solely internal, validity of the international agree-
ments involved.
During debate in Parliament, these provisions became the focus of cer-
tain anxieties acutely felt in current Greek politics. Along with the provi-
sions of Article 28(2) and (3), Article 27 was seen as symbolic of an entire
range of issues relating to the protection of national independence, mainly
as against powerful friends rather than enemies. Declarations in various
forms were proposed asserting the inalienable character of national inde-
pendence.32 Both factions of the Communist Party present in Parliament
sought to incorporate in the Constitution declarations of adherence to the
principles of peaceful coexistence. Other proposals sought a specific pro-
vision requiring revision, within a definite period, of existing multilateral
and bilateral military pacts (i.e., those concerning NATO and U.S. bases). 83
The objectives of most of these suggestions were fairly clear: in broader
context, protection of the nation's independence from "entangling alliances"
with powerful countries. This position reflects a long-delayed reaction
against the traditional acceptance in Greek foreign policy of a Great Power
(Great Britain for a long time, and since 1947, the United States) as the
nation's exclusive "patron." 2
PRLATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MuNIciPAL LAW
The provisions of Article 28(1) are probably the most interesting from
a strictly legal point of view. Under the previous Constitutions, and in the
absence of express constitutional language, the place of international law
rules in internal Greek law has been fairly well settled in legal theory
and case-law, although much less so in administrative and legislative prac-
tice. The principle that the "generally accepted rules of international law"
(i.e., customary international law) form an integral part of Greek law,
with no need for express incorporation by law, has been settled for a long
time.35 As to international agreements, it has been generally accepted that
for them to have any internal force, they must be sanctioned by act of
Parliament"8 Once this was done, their legal force was the same as that
of regular acts of Parliament. Greek legal doctrine described the con-
82 For a reasoned defense of such language, see G. Tenekides, Our External Orienta-
tions and the Constitution-I, To Vn.A, Jan. 12, 1975 (in Greek).
3s The agreements in question are currently being renegotiated. It was said in debate
that a "transitional" provision on the subject would be included in the Constitution.
No such clause appears in the final text.2t The best study in English of the impact of foreign "protection" on the country's
early constitutional development is, N. KALTCHaS, INTODUCTION TO unE CONSTrru-
TIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN GrcE (1940).
35 Cf. Areopagus [Greek Court of Cassation] Judgment No. 14/1896.
35 See the discussion supra, text accompanying notes 22-27.
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sequences in familiar terms: treaties cannot contravene the Constitution;
they supersede earlier acts of Parliament; they are superseded by later
acts of Parliament. Actual practice, however, cannot be summarized so
easily. On the one hand, the courts frequently insisted that a statute
cannot supersede a treaty by mere implication; the legislative intent to do
so must be expressely stated.37 On the other hand, provisions of prior
statutes clearly contravening later treaties were treated in several instances
as being still in effect.38
The initial government draft of the 1975 Constitution did not attempt to
deal with any of these issues. It contained only a vague reference to
Greece's adherence to international law, basically in the same terms as the
declaration ultimately placed in Article 2(2). The constitutional experts'
proposals directly addressed the issue; going beyond settled doctrine, they
provided not only that customary international law was part of Greek law
but also that international treaties prevailed over both prior and subsequent
Greek laws.aa Proposals in this sense were introduced in Parliament by both
government and opposition deputies. Although the topic was discussed
at some length, opinions were not divided along party lines. The govern-
ment spokesmen accepted with relative ease the substance of the proposals,
although they refused to commit themselves to any specific formulation
during the early stages of the debate in subcommittee and full committee.
The definite text was thus formulated and adopted during the very last
debate, in full Parliament, which took place before the opposition's de-
parture and abstention. 0
No serious problems arose with respect to customary international law.
Some doubts concerning the uncertain content of the term were laid to
rest by the adoption of a provision charging a Special Supreme Court
established by the new Constitution with the task of settling disputes over
the "generally accepted" character of international law rules.41 There was
more controversy concerning the legal effect of treaties. Several members
of Parliament insisted on the necessity of retaining the distinction betveen
prior statutes and subsequent ones, and of providing that treaties override
only the former. Parliament would thus retain the power to enact a
statute superseding an earlier treaty. Others adopted an opposite view,
arguing that once a treaty was concluded and put into effect internally
(by means of a statute), it could be deprived of legal force only through
its abrogation in accordance with international law rules.
The issue was resolved in the same manner as to both customary and
conventional international law. They were given enhanced formal validity,
37 See, Evrigenis, supra note 25, at 355-56.
3s See the detailed discussion in, Valticos, supra note 26, at 224 ff.
39 See To VA, Jan. 19, 1975. See also Tenekides, supra note 32; Calogeropoulos-
Stratis, supra note 11.
40 Debate of April 2, 1975, on the minutes of which the discussion in the next
two paragraphs is based.
411975 Constitution, Article 100(1)(vi). This Special Supreme Court is not a
permanent body; it is composed of the Presidents and some members of the country's
highest courts.
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so that they supersede both prior and subsequent acts of Parliament. The
constitutional language of Article 28(1) is not quite clear on this point.
One might even draw a conclusion to the opposite effect from the fact that
an earlier proposed formulation, "shall prevail over any contrary provision
of law, whether prior or subsequent," was replaced by the present, "shall
prevail over any contrary provision of law." However, debate went mainly
in the other direction. An eloquent defense of the superiority of customary
international law over domestic legislation by an opposition deputy met
with nearly unanimous assent. More important, in closing the debate, the
Minister of Justice, spokesman for the government, expressly stated: "Ve
accept that the generally accepted rules of international law must have in-
creased validity. We also accept this with respect to treaties, indeed par
excellence." 41 That last authoritative statement suggests that "any con-
trary provision of law" was understood to include both prior and sub-
sequent statutes.
The application of this principle in judicial and administrative practice
is bound to raise a number of problems. It will be interesting to follow
the evolution of Greek case-law in the years to come. The new constitu-
tional principle is likely to enhance the importance of the distinction be-
tween self-executing and non-self-executing treaties and treaty provisions.
The distinction is already receiving increasing attention in Western Europe,
because of its role in the implementation of multilateral agreements such
as the GATT and the Treaty of Rome. The subject was not raised in the
recent debates over the new Greek Constitution. Past Greek practice
clearly recognizes that some treaties are self-executing,43 although there
are as usual considerable ambiguities and inconsistencies. 44 It might have
been worthwhile for Parliament to address this issue, when considering
Article 28(1), even though it is by no means certain that useful rules on
the subject can be devised and formulated at the constitutional level.
CONCLUDING COMAMNTs
The process of constitution-making in Greece during the first half of 1975
took place in too brief a time to allow detailed study and careful prepara-
tion on all issues. Public attention was in the main focussed on the provi-
sions relating to civil rights and the respective powers of the President and
Parliament, not on those concerning international affairs. The provisions of
the new Constitution in the latter area serve to bring Greek law more or
less in line with most other Western European Constitutions. There are
obscurities and gaps that better preparation could no doubt have removed.
More important, the text ultimately adopted has no original features cor-
responding to the country's particular conditions or offering solutions to
42 The Minister noted in this connection that any possible rigidities of such a rule
would be tempered by application of the principles of reciprocity and -ebus sic
stantibus.
43 Indeed, Professor Evrigenis has concluded that Greek courts are rather liberal in
considering treaties as self-executing, supra note 25, at 357.
44 See, Valticos, supra note 26, at 212 ff.
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difficulties that have arisen in other countries. To the extent that an
attempt is made to reconcile democratic principle with executive flexibility,
the outcome is skewed in favor of the latter.
Yet it cannot be denied that the new provisions on international affairs
constitute an advance over previous texts. At least in the cases where
special majorities are required, the role of Parliament (and of the opposi-
tion parties in it) is bound to be enhanced-at least in future Parliaments,
with a more evenly balanced distribution of seats. The substantive condi-
tions imposed on certain classes of state commitments are likely to shape
future parliamentary debates. The new Constitution also makes possible
'(or, in some cases, easier than it was) the invocation and application of
international law principles and rules before or by Greek courts and
other authorities at the behest of individuals or political groups. To deter-
mine the actual extent and effectiveness of these developments, one must
await the growth of case-law and parliamentary practice. But some im-
pact seems inevitable.
While far too short and, like all such discussions, plagued with much
confusion, the debate in the Greek Parliament showed considerable aware-
ness of and concern over the role of international affairs and their inter-
action with domestic political issues. The country's recent experience under
a military dictatorship which combined arbitrariness and brutality with a
barracks-room type of legalism and an acute sensitivity to foreign pres-
sures has made Greeks conscious of a fundamental ambivalence in the
impact of international law on their domestic affairs.
The country's involvement in a complex network of international legal
relations gave democratic forces in Greece several new and effective chan-
nels for attacks upon and restrictions over the dictatorship. The proceed-
ings before the Council of Europe and the European Commission of Hu-
man Rights constitute the clearest and perhaps the most important case.
But there were other activities by dissenting Greeks or by democratically-
minded foreign representatives within other international organizations
and in other international contexts. Their immediate effectiveness may
have been limited but, taken together, they played an important role in
keeping the Greek dictatorship exposed to international condemnation, in
not allowing either the Greek Government or its allies within the govern-
ments of other countries to return to "business as usual," " and in generally
limiting the effective capabilities of the military regime. Invocation of
international legal principles, standards, and commitments before domestic
courts in Greece was also seen as helpful (albeit to a limited extent) in the
struggle by democratic forces against the regime. The country's long
45 For a discussion of some of the methods by which the U.S. Government tried to
manipulate legal considerations relative to its continuing recognition of the military
regime, see A. A. Fatouros, How to Resolve Problems by Refusing to Acknowledge
They Exist: Some Legal Parameters of Recent U.S. Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus,
in T. A. CouLoumis and S. M. IcKS, eds., CoNrFERNcE PRoCmEDNGs. U.S. FoRmN
PoLicy Towum GreecE AND CYPRUs: THE CLAsa OF PRIcIPLE AND PAmmTsM (The
Center for Mediterranean Studies, Washington, D.C., 1975) 20, at 21-26.
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history of dependence upon foreign patrons, the regime's continuing need
for material and political support from foreign states, and to some extent
the regime's own peculiar legalism may have helped to enhance this role
of international legal factors.
On the other hand, the experience of the recent dictatorship has created
a new sensitivity to claims for national independence in substantive (eco-
nomic and political) as well as formal (legal) terms. The dominant posi-
tion of the United States in Greece rendered its support (or, in the official
version, its tolerance) of the military regime a significant element of
strength for that regime. Continuing participation in international organ-
izations gave the regime not only some claim to the legitimacy it lacked
but also sorely needed material resources. As a result, there is today in
Greece widespread distrust of international commitments to foreign states
or international organizations which are or may become oppressive for
the weaker party. They are seen as establishing and strengthening un-
equal relationships and facilitating extensive penetration of the country's
political, economic, and legal processes.
These problems, desires, and considerations pull in opposite directions,
the former toward broader commitment to international legal principles
and institutions, the latter toward raising barriers to external commitments
so as to limit outside interference. Such dilemmas are in varying degrees
operative in all nations, but they are particularly acute in small, weak, and
dependent nations, like Greece. To cope with them, a country must act
with care and deliberation and must devote considerable resources to
foreign affairs decision-making. Increased national autonomy takes more
than a declaration of independence."8  The "independence" sought must
be defined more subtly than traditional legal categories allow. In the last
analysis, a country's political and economic dependence represents as much
the will to power of the patron state as the perception of national interest
(and of their own factional interests) of successive governments of the
client state. The pursuit of national autonomy requires many and diverse
concrete decisions and actions, continuing efforts over a long time, and a
reasonably clear consensus on the acceptable sacrifices and risks from
incidental events as well as from structural changes.
At the same time, a state must establish constitutional structures which
allow the democratic principles operative in its domestic decision-making
to obtain in foreign affairs, as well. This is, of course, a discrete issue.
It is a problem which all states face, including the dominant ones. But
in countries like Greece, with fragile democratic institutions and a long
habit of dependence on foreign patrons, the two issues become indissolubly
intert-ined.
Greece's current efforts to assume full membership in the European
Communities raise in microcosm the entire range of contradictory neces-
46 The definitional and other problems of the concepts of autonomy, dependence, and
the like, and their relevance to international law cannot be discussed here; they must
be left for future elaboration elsewhere.
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sities and desires: the need to "open up" the country's legal system to
international (here supranational) legal regulation, the fear of domination
by powerful friends, the difficulty of assuring democratic decision-making
processes and principles on vital issues.
These perceptions and concerns cannot find expression in the rather
simplistic traditional contrast between nationalist and internationalist posi-
tions. Relevant inquiries must focus on the differential impact of various
types of external commitments on a specific state's domestic political and
social forces and structures-who benefits and to what extent, from which
measures, under what (and how probable) conditions. From the view-
point of those committed to the values of democracy and national auton-
omy, difficult judgments are needed concerning the manner and the extent
to which involvement in international legal activity can be made to en-
hance both values.
The new Greek Constitution certainly does not resolve or transcend these
dilemmas. Yet, the beginnings of awareness of them among political
leaders which the constitution-making process made evident raise a hope
of future concern and continuing effort.
